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Talk in Manchester: 24 May

andrewmcgettigan's avatarCritical Education

‘The politics & policy of English HE in 2018: why is another review under way?’

Date: Thursday 24 May 2018

Time: 5.30pm

Venue: B3, Alliance Manchester Business School

Free. All Welcome.

More details

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Talks in Leicester (Wed 9 May)

andrewmcgettigan's avatarCritical Education

Update:
Both talks will now be in
: Room 501, Ken Edwards Building

I will be giving two talks at University of Leicester on Wed 9 May.

The first, from 3.00-4.15pm, will be a student-focused event with a short introduction followed by Q&A.

The title is:  ‘What’s happening to your student loans? Theresa May’s dilemma’

The second is aimed at academics and the general public.

Title:
‘The politics and policy of English Higher Education in 2018: why is another review under way?’

Time: 4.30-6pm

More details here.

View original post

Teaching page updated – Saturday Summer School Courses at City Lit

Along with Rich Cochrane, I teach mathematics and its history and philosophy at City Lit, an adult education college in London.

I have added to my teaching page the four Saturday we are offering this year as part of its summer school:

  • Euclidean Geometry
  • Geometry & Design in Moorish Spain
  • Lyotard’s Postmodern Condition
  • Introduction to Philosophy & History of Mathematics
    (covering the prerequisites for our term-long courses in the regular academic timetable)

Talks in Leicester (Wed 9 May)

Update:
Both talks will now be in
: Room 501, Ken Edwards Building

I will be giving two talks at University of Leicester on Wed 9 May.

The first, from 3.00-4.15pm, will be a student-focused event with a short introduction followed by Q&A.

The title is:  ‘What’s happening to your student loans? Theresa May’s dilemma’

The second is aimed at academics and the general public.

Title:
‘The politics and policy of English Higher Education in 2018: why is another review under way?’

Time: 4.30-6pm

More details here.

ONS announces review of accounting for student loans

Along with today’s public sector finance figures, the Office for National Statistics has responded to February’s Treasury Committee report on student loans and announced  collaborative, international “work” on income contingent student loans.

Student loans in the UK are different from typical loans. Notably, they have a high degree of contingency in that repayments are conditional on subsequent income and under certain conditions the loan obligation itself may be cancelled. Estimates of the proportion of student loans that will be cancelled, or written off, in the future have been rising in recent years and are a significant proportion of the total value.

… accounting standards are very clear on the treatment of loans and it is this treatment that ONS currently applies to student loans. Where the guidance in these standards is more difficult, and subject to interpretation, is around the recording of financial assets with a significant expected loss – student loans with their contingency on future income are a financial asset with this feature.

To consider the treatment of such financial assets and the accounting issues they raise, we have begun work with international agencies and other National Statistical Offices. This is a complex topic that could have potential implications for all countries with income-contingent loans. However, it is planned that through this work, initiated by ONS, an appropriate statistical treatment in national accounts can be agreed internationally.

… there could be an impact on public sector net borrowing (PSNB) … as [this measure is] impacted by interest that is accrued but not paid and loan cancellations. The extent of any impact is unknown and would depend on the details of any new internationally-agreed treatment.

As part of the same announcement, ONS has decided to classify December’s securitisation of student as a “genuine sale” and concluded that Income Contingent Student Loans 1 (2002-2006) Plc is a “financial corporation outside the public sector”.

I have asked ONS for an explanation of the decision.

For the public finances, the implications are:

The implications for the public sector finances are that the PSNCR [Public Sector Net Cash Requirement] and PSND [Public Sector Net Debt] are both reduced by the £1.7 billion cash value received from the sale, PSNFL [Public Sector Net Financial Liabilities] is increased by approximately £1.8 billion – the difference between the nominal value of the loans sold and the sale price – while PSNB [Public Sector Net Borrowing] is not impacted.

PSNB is commonly referred to as the “deficit”. The rationale for excluding the loss on loans (and the additional loss from selling) is explained in this post. The government does not target PSNFL in its fiscal mandate.

This classification decision is also contingent on the review described above.

This classification and the impact on the public sector finances is consistent with the international standards for the accounting of loans. However, as noted previously, we have begun to consider with the international statistical community how UK student loans are most appropriately recorded within national accounts. Following this work and its conclusion, if the recording of student loans was revised then consequently the recording of the student loan sale might also need to be changed. However, whether there would be an impact and the extent of any such impact depends on the details of any new internationally-agreed treatment.

For a general explanation of why the current treatment is cock-eyed, see this post which sets out why the current treatment of loans in PSNB (‘the deficit’) is distorted.

 

Talk in Manchester: 24 May

‘The politics & policy of English HE in 2018: why is another review under way?’

Date: Thursday 24 May 2018

Time: 5.30pm

Venue: B3, Alliance Manchester Business School

Free. All Welcome.

More details

About this blog

As a freelance writer (who does a bit of hourly-paid teaching in philosophy, mathematics and programming), I run this blog on a voluntary basis with no commercial or outside support.

I aim to provide an alternative take on English HE with a focus on finances and have provided about 20,000 words per year since I started 2011. The site has broken several national stories and has more recently led the way in uncovering the fiscal illusions in student loan accounting and how they skew policy decisions like the recent securitisation.

If you want a view on the accounts and finances at a particular university, I will consider requests.

Please do consider donating.

Please see About page for more details.

Fiscal Distortions – rolling loan cohorts & national account implications

I have in a previous post explained the basic presentational advantages accorded to student loans under national accounting conventions. In particular, a graduate tax with identical cashflows and therefore long-run costs would have a completely different impact on the deficit measure, which the government targets in its fiscal mandate.

Because a loan creates an asset (money owed to government), interest accruing against the outstanding balance counts as income (though it is receivable, not received) and write-offs, when they occur, count as capital expenditure. The net effect – the difference between the two – equates to the loss (or surplus) made on the loans issued for a particular cohort.

For a graduate tax, there is no asset, only a policy, and so a graduate tax cannot exploit the conventions governing loans as “financial transactions”. For that identically costing graduate tax, annual outlay counts as current expenditure and repayments count as income.

As explained before, the timings therefore flatter the student loan scheme: Annual Interest Accrued is recorded as income every year and the expenditure item occurs only at the end, when accounts are closed and balances written off.

For the graduate tax, the opposite happens: expenditure is recorded first and then gradually undone by payments coming in.

If you suffer from deficit fetishism, or just opportunism, then this rules out a graduate tax.

I have explained this before. It forms part of what the Office for Budgetary Responsibility calls a ‘fiscal illusion’. (In its most recent Economic & Fiscal Outlook, OBR again complained that the treatment of student loan interest ‘does not reflect fiscal reality’.)

The problem arises because here the government exploits international accounting conventions on loans. They are designed for loans which are repaid in full and in particular loans where periodic repayments at least match interest accruing. The conventions were not designed to cope with income contingent repayment loans with large subsidies.

As a result, the Treasury Committee has asked the Office for National Statistics to review the accounting treatment for student loans:

The Government is not responsible for the international accounting rules that allow the fiscal illusions within student loans to exist. However, the National Accounts accounting rules regarding financial transactions were not intended to be used for loans that, as the Government readily promotes, are designed to not be paid back in full. Loans that are intended to be written off are, in substance, a partially repayable grant rather than a loan. The ONS should re-examine its classification of student loans as financial assets—which they are in legal form—and consider whether a portion of the loan should, in substance, be classed as a grant.
Paragraph 31, Student Loans

Here, I want to underscore two further points using OBR figures.  Read more…

Real interest rates – submission to Treasury Committee report

I recommend reading the Treasury Committee’s report into Student Loans. It was published last month and is based on a series of hearings held from October to December.

I prepared a couple of private submissions before my appearance as a witness. Unfortunately I neglected to “OK” them for publication afterwards. One was on the background to interest rates on student loans; the other a briefing on accounting.

I have covered the accounting on here in detail but the interest rate piece summarises some thoughts that came together at the time. The pdf below gives some background to the following extract from the Treasury report:

The Committee also took evidence from Dr Andrew McGettigan who, when asked about the interest rate as a mechanism to introduce a degree of progressivity into the student finance system, argued that this was not the Government’s original intention.
(page 17)

The exchange referenced above can be seen in the following extract from the transcript.

Rushanara Ali: Do you agree with the IFS that the high interest rates will act as a redistributive tool from higher earners to lower earners? That is what the evidence seems to be pointing to as well. Do you have any further comments to add to that?
Dr McGettigan: I do not think that is what it was meant to do. There is some careful distinction to be made between whether we think higher earners are repaying more than the equivalent of what they borrowed in the first place, so you make a little surplus on them and that cross-subsidises the scheme and brings up the average. The original  design was very careful to minimise the number of people who were going to be repaying more than they borrowed and the extra surplus they would be repaying.
Rushanara Ali: The Government has been accidentally progressive. That is interesting.
Dr McGettigan: This is what I mean about a series of piecemeal decisions. On the original loan scheme, the discount rate was RPI plus 2.2%, which is in the ballpark of an interest rate taper from RPI to RPI plus 3%. When you change the discount rate down to RPI plus 0.7%, all of a sudden you are making a spread and the additional interest that is being repaid is much larger. You have not changed your projection of cashflows, but you have changed how you value those cashflows.
People will not feel it in their pocket, but you are saying, “I value those repayments higher now, so I am making less of a loss”. When you look at it in terms of “Am I getting more back from them than I lent to them?” it will look like that, because you have pushed up the value of all those repayments.
One thing about the design of the interest rate taper was it was tied to this idea that the cost of borrowing was RPI plus 2.2%. You can see that in the extract from the Browne Report I put in my written submission. They were suggesting an interest rate at RPI plus 2.2% in the Browne Report, and we have got one of nought to three. The discount rate change in 2015 has altered this profoundly, and not because it was a planned decision to try to introduce a redistributive element to the payments.

Rushanara Ali: Whether it happened deliberately or accidentally, we are where we are. What is your assessment of this tool, as a more redistributive mechanism for financing, given that 40% of the lower earners would be better off than the pre-2012 system? If you disagree with it, what is the alternative? What might be the alternative to this model?
Dr McGettigan: At the moment, I do not understand what it is trying to achieve anymore, because it has been divorced from the discount rate. That is my first point. Is it there because it is an incentive for higher earners to make additional voluntary repayments? The Treasury has a preference for cash today, as we know from the sale. If you have a real interest rate, is it signalling to borrowers that they should consider making additional repayments over and beyond what is demanded of them each month? That may be part of the design.
The other point is, if you lower the interest rate, the people who will benefit are the highest earners. That is clear. It is a regressive move in that technical sense.
Presentationally and optically, it [the current interest rate] is awful. You are having people making decisions: “Should I look at alternative finance options? Should I remortgage for the sake of my children, because I can get a lower interest rate?” In my opinion, those questions should not even be on the table. No one should be asked to make that kind of decision. The loan scheme should be clearly the best deal out there. No one should be taxing themselves to work out between the options.

…

Dr McGettigan: I have one very quick point: the interest rate on pre-2012 loans is recognised to be an impediment to their sale to the private sector, because it is below RPI. Another thing you have to factor in here is whether the overall real interest rate design is also because it is much closer to a private sector preference for potential purchase of post-2012 loans if they are ever offered to market.

PDF: Real Interest Rates on Student Loans REVISED

Talk – Where did it go wrong for the English fee-loan regime? (KCL, Wed 28 March)

Where did it go wrong for the English fee-loan regime?

King’s College London
Wednesday 28th  March 2018  17.00 – 18.30

Venue: Bush House
Room: NE -1.01

Abstract
Introduced as part of the Coalition government’s austerity programme, “post-2012” undergraduate fees were given a more substantive rationale when student numbers controls were lifted from universities in 2015. The shift to loans was presented as central to ending the rationing of full-time places for Home and EU students and the new regime was trumpeted as a triumph of secure, sustainable funding.

Just three years later and terms on loans have been changed twice, before even two full years of graduate repayments have come in. Now the government has announced a major review, backed by an independent expert panel.

This talk will outline what’s going on in terms of the politics, the finances and the accounting and set out the likely implications for undergraduate teaching for 2019 onwards.